CREATING A DIVERSITY OF VoicEs: LocAL EXPRESSION
THROUGH A Low POWER RADIO SERVICE
Fatima Fofana

I. INTRODUCTION
"Where there is even a pretense.of democracy, communications are at its heart"1

The broadcast industry in America has had a
long tradition of encouraging many voices from
many locations. The tradition of diversity of viewpoints at the core of democracy is threatened by
the reforms of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("1996 Act"). 2 Since the passage of the 1996
Act, the American system of broadcasting, characterized by stations distributed across America,
each the voice of its own hometown has been relegated to a tangled web of mass corporate ownership. Nowhere is. this tangle of interests more apparent than in the local community's battle to
gain access to the airwaves through low power
broadcasting.
Since its beginning, radio has been the quintessential local communications service. 3 It is at the
center of local communities perhaps more than
any other medium. Over ninety-five percent of
Americans listen to radio on a daily basis, which
I Greg Ruggiero, Microradio Broadcasting:Aquascalientes of
the Airwaves, Z MAGAZINE, Dec. 1998, at 25 (quoting Noam
Chomsky) (hereinafter Ruggiero].
2
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. II
1997)) [hereinafter the 1996 Act].
3
See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Lucas A.
Powe, Jr., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994) (discussing the early history of radio); Id. at pp. 5-32 [hereinafter
Krattenmaker & Powe].
4
See FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Address at the
National Association of Broadcasters Radio Convention (October 16, 1998) [hereinafter Kennard Address at NAB Convention].
5 See generally Timothy Aeppel and William M. Bulkeley,
Westinghouse to Buy American Radio, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,
1997, at Al (discussing Westinghouse's move to purchase
American Radio System Corp. The acquisition is part of a
trend of consolidation in the radio industry since the 1996
Act). See also Eben Shapiro, Golden Oldie: A Wave of Buyouts
Has Radio Industry Beaming With Success, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18,

1997, at Al (noting that since Congress deregulated broad-

averages to nearly twenty hours per week. 4
Although radio remains a pervasive means of
communication, the passage of the 1996 Act has
dramatically reshaped the radio industry by ushering in an unprecedented number of corporate
consolidations*.. Large publicly-traded corporations are acquiring a great number of radio stations at an alarming rate. 6 Over the past two
years, more than one-third of all radio stations
have consolidated into larger companies as a result of the 1996 Act's deregulation of ownership
restrictions. 7 The negative impact of the streamlining of broadcast ownership regulations has effected even the smallest markets across the country and as a result, there are less diverse
viewpoints carried over the airwaves. 8
Since the beginning of broadcasting in the
United States, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") restrained the
number of broadcast stations that one party may
own, both locally and nationally. 9 The Commission's restrictions were an effort to emphasize dicast ownership regulations, the radio industry has rapidly become the hottest sector in the media field).
6
See, e.g.,
Peter K. Pitsch, An "InnovationAge" Perspective
On Telecommunications Mergers (visited January 20, 1999)
<http://www.cse.org/cse/ia43-csef-telecom.htm>.
7
See FCC Commissioner Gloria Tristani, Address before
the Texas Broadcasters Association, Sept. 3, 1998 (observing
that despite a national increase of 3% in the number of stations, the number of radio station owners has decreased by
12% over the past two years). The radio industry has also lost
an average of three owners in each of the top ten radio markets and about one owner in each smaller market. See id.
[hereinafter Tristani Address before TBA].
8 See generally Mike Harrington, A-B-C, See You Real Soon:
BroadcastMedia Mergers And EnsuringA "Diversity Of Voices, "38
B.C.L. REv. 497, 538 (1997) (noting that any attempt to ensure
a diversity of voices should not be in the form of more regulation, instead, Congress must emphasize the importance it
places on the broadcast industry maintaining a marketplace
of ideas).
9 See Jill Howard, Congress Errs in Deregulation Broadcast
Ownership Caps: More Monopolies, Less Localism, DecreasedDiver-
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versity of ownership of radio stations as part of its'
congressional mandate to regulate radio in the
public interest.10 Despite this mandate, the 1996
Act has allowed the FCC to downplay its duty to
serve the public interest in local broadcasting.
The principle of diversity of ownership in broadcast media has slipped in the rush to deregulate
the industry in the name of competition. The increasing centralization of ownership of radio stations has had two detrimental effects: less localism
and diminished diversity.
The concentration of ownership has decreased
the number of locally owned radio stations,"'
12
thereby limiting the number of diverse outlets.
Deregulation has not only had the effect of concentration of ownership, it curiously has also had

the side effect of giving rise to a number of "radio
pirates" 13 affecting the industry. 1 4 The FCC recognizes the consequences of deregulation in the
broadcast industry and the impact of consolidation on diversity of ownership. 15 Consequently,
the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 in which it proposes to license new
1000-watt low-power FM ("LPFM") radio stations
as well as 100-watt secondary station service in
hope of better serving communities at the local
level. 17 In the rulemaking the FCC also sought
comment on establishing a third "microradio"1 8
class at power levels from 1-10 Watts.' 9
Part I of this Comment traces the development
of radio regulation before the 1996 Act. Part II
explains the changes in the radio industry as a re-

sity and Violations of Equal Protection,5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
269, 269 (1997) (stating that the ownership restrictions were
created by Congress to serve two objectives: 1) to preserve
the First Amendment's spirit of promoting the public welfare, "by providing diverse and antagonistic viewpoints"; and,
2) "promoting competition in order to ensure efficient use of
resources").
10 In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress created
the FCC to "to execute and enforce the provisions of [the
1934] Act." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. II 1997). In
enumerating the powers of the Commission, Congress required the FCC's regulations to be in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp.
11 1997). The phrase "public interest", as applied to broadcast media, originally appeared in the 1927 Radio Act. See
also generally, Erwin G. Krasnow, The "PublicInterest" Standard:
The Elusive Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605,
610 (1998)(citing Newton N. Minow and Craig L. Lamay,
Standard in the Wasteland, Children, Television and the First
Amendment, 4 (1995)) [hereinafter Krasnow]. The 1927 act
does not comment on the origins of the phrase 'public interest'. See id.
11 See In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Notice of Inquiry, 13 FCC Rcd. 11276, paras. 18-19
(1998) (documenting an increase in the number of radio stations from 10,222 to 10,475, a total of 2.5% increase). The
rapid mergers of some of the top radio station owners has
resulted in a decrease in the number of owners of commercial radio stations by 11.7%, from 5,105 to 4,507. See id. The
Commission also noted a downward trend in the number of
local radio stations in small Metro markets from 12 to 11,
totaling approximately a decrease of one owner per market.
See id. In addition, the smallest radio Metro markets (markets
101-265), have declined from 9 to 8 owners. See id.
12 See id. at para. 6 (stating that diversity is divided into
three sections: viewpoint, outlet and source). Viewpoint diversity includes material presented by the media that covers a
wide array of diverse and antagonistic opinions and interpretations. See id. Outlet diversity represents numerous delivery
services such as newspapers and the Internet, which prepare
and present programs directly to national and local audiences. See id. Lastly, source diversity includes the promotion

of a variety of management, such as producers and owners.
See id.
13 See Jim Cullen, Pirate Radio Fights for Free Speech, THE
PROGREssIvE POPULIST (April 1998) (defining radio pirates as
unlicensed broadcasters that include community talk shows,
city council meetings and. militia rants) [hereinafter Cullen].
14 See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair,
Theirs To Steal, Ours To Win, Battle For The Soundwaves, COUNTERPUNCH Vol.6, No. 6, 6 (Mar. 16-31, 1999) (claiming that
99.99 percent of the public does not have access to the public
airwaves as a result of the 1996 Act). In addition, radio pirates have emerged in resistance to the corporate mergers

that have occurred at high rates. See id. See also Cullen supra
note 13.
15 See supra note 5 at Al (noting that since the passage of
the 1996 Act, more than a quarter of the country's 10,000
radio stations have acquired new owners).

16 See In Re Creation of Low Power Radio Service, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, (Feb. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Low Power
Radio Service NPRM].
17 See Low Power Radio Service NPRM supra note 16 at paras. 22-33 (proposing a 1000-Watt primary service, subject to
the majority of the service rules. It would operate at a maximum radius of 1000 watts). The 100-watt class would be
designed to provide affordable service to communities of
moderate size. See id. at para. 30. The LPIOO service would
allow stations to operate at a maximum of 100 watts and 30
meters (98 feet). See id at 30.
18
See Cullen, supra note 13 (explaining that the word
"microradio," meaning micro-power broadcasting, was
coined by Mbana Kantako of the Black Liberation Radio in
Springfield, Illinois).
19 See Low Power Radio Service NPRM supra note 16, at paras. 10-14. The 1-10 watt secondary "microradio" service
would permit an individual or small number of people with
limited financial resources to provide service to a very small
community. See id. at para. 34. The Commission received over
13,000 inquiries in 1998 from various private organizations,
who were interested in starting a new low power radio station
("LPFM"). See id at para 11. The Commission notes that the
level of interest in creating a new LPFM indicates the need
for a microradio service that would establish an outlet for
new voices and serve the needs of small communities. See id.
at paras. 10-14.
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sult of the 1996 Act. Part III of this Comment discusses the need for a low power radio service in
light of the Commission's Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking. Part IV analyzes the need for the
Commission to return to its original mandate of
promoting diversity of ownership and localism.

Finally, Part V concludes that the creation of a low
power radio service would serve the needs of
small communities and provide clear-cut opportu-

nities for minorities to secure ownership in the radio industry.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADIO
REGULATION

A.

An Explosion of Interest: The Radio Act
of 1927

passed the number of commercial stations by a ra26
tio of at least two-to-one.
Shortly thereafter, the explosion of interest in
noncommercial stations in particular, prompted'
Congress to pass the Radio Act of 1927,27 thereby
creating the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC"),
the precursor of today's FCC. The purpose of the
FRC was to allocate frequencies among applicants
in consideration of the "the public interest, con'2 8
venience, and necessity."
The FRC provided noncommercial stations less
radio time than commercial stations and also limited broadcast radio licenses to three-month
terms.2 9 Between 1927 and 1934, noncommercial
radio nearly disappeared, averaging merely 2 percent of all airtime by 1934.30
B.

Regulation for the Public Interest: The

Guglielmo Marconi 20 introduced radio to the
western world in 1895.21 Radio did not become a
phenomenon of widespread interest, however,
until 1912 when hundreds of pioneers began
broadcasting in America. 22 The surge of interest
in radio prompted Congress to pass the Radio Act
of 1912,23 requiring all broadcasters to obtain a
license. 24 It was under the Radio Act of 1912 that
noncommercial radio 25 developed, and by the
1920s, noncommercial radio stations had sur-

The Communications Act of 1934,31 which established the FCC, charged the Commission with
regulating all interstate radio and wire communications and the issuance of licenses to broadcast32
ers who promised to serve the public interest.
The basis of the FCC's authority lies in its man-

Guglielmo Marconi was the founder of the Marconi
Company. He created the "wireless telegraph", to transmit
and receive messages from the airwaves. See Krattenmaker &
Powe, supra note 3, at 5-6 (1995).
21
See Ruggiero, supra note 1, at 25 (by 1907, people became interested in technology generally, and by 1912, many
pioneers began to establish their own broadcast facilities).
22
See id.
23
See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that
by 1912, ship-to-shore communication encountered significant interference, thereby prompting the Navy to demand
regulation of the airwaves).
24
See id. (noting that the United States were signatories
to the first international radio treaty negotiated in 1912, and
as such was obligated to conform to treaty regulations to further wireless conformity and compatibility). See id. In response to these developments, Congress passed the Radio
Act of 1912 which required broadcasters to obtain licenses
and forbade the operation of radio equipment without a license, but did not set aside frequencies for private broadcast.
See id.
25
See id. at 6 (explaining that under the Radio Act of
1912, the government was authorized to determine which
communications were more important than others). See id.
The government developed several "categories" of broadcasting including a commercial for profit category for which
there was a direct charge imposed on the user, and a noncommercial category. See id. at 8. The noncommercial category was designed primarily for amateurs and was for not-forprofit purposes. See id.

See Ruggiero supra, note 1, at 25.
The Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
28
It was the Radio Act of 1927 that first introduced the
phrase "public interest" to the broadcast industry. See Krasnow, supra note 10, at 610. There is no explanation of the
origins of the phrase "pubic interest" in the legislative history
of the 1927 act. See id. However, it was reported that a young
attorney, detailed to the Senate from the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), suggested to the drafters of the
Radio Act the words "public interest, convenience and necessity", the standard used by the ICC. See id. The legislative history of this phrase has been the focus of immense scholarly
debate in the field of broadcasting. See id. For a broad discussion of FCC and court rulings stemming from the public interest standard, see generally, Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note
3, at 143-74.
29
See Ruggiero supra note 1 at 25.
30
See id. at 26.
31
The Communications Act of 1934 c. 452, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934).
32
Section 151 of the Communications Act states in part:
"For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make
available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
States ...nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities..." ". . .there is created a commission to be known as the 'Federal Communications Commission,' which shall be constituted as hereinafter
provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions
of this chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).

20

Federal Communications Act of 1934
1.

26
27

The FCC's New Mandate

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

date to provide for the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." 3- The passage of the Communi-

cations Act of 1934 thus provided the Commission
34
with a sweeping grant of regulatory authority.
The public interest standard is a vague mandate,
long recognized by the courts as the basis for the
theory that diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest because it promotes
the diversity of programs and viewpoints. 35 The
foundation of the Commission's authority as a
public trustee therefore, lies in its mandate to
provide for the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity." 36 Acting on this mandate, the Commission consistently maintained that diversification
of mass media ownership serves the public interest by promoting diversity of programming and
viewpoints. 37 Indeed, such broad exposure to
ideas is essential to the maintenance of a vibrant
democracy.
By 1940, the Commission launched its broadcast ownership control efforts by prohibiting a licensee in the same broadcast service from ob38
taining additional licenses in the same market.
The first quantifiable limit placed a cap on the
number of FM radio outlets under national common ownership to six stations. 39 The Supreme
Court's conclusion in Associated Press v. U.S.,40 that

the First Amendment "rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public," 4 1 influenced
See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
See id.
315 See FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 2104 (1978).
36
See 47 U.S.C.A. § 303 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (providing an inventory of the FCC's powers, all of which must be
carried out to safeguard the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity").
37 See Krattenmaker & Powe supra note 3, at 143-74.
38
See generally, In re Sherwood B. Brunton, Decision, 11
F.C.C. 407 (1946).
39 See id. at 413 (declining not to place an absolute limit
on AM station ownership as the FCC held that, with respect
to AM stations, concentration of control "is not a factor of
the absolute number of stations alone but depends also upon
33

34

the character of the facilities involved, e.g., the powers and
the frequencies of the stations").
40 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
41
Id. at 20.
42
In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636
of the Comm'n Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Std.,

FM, and TV Brdcst. Stations, First Report and Order,22 F.C.C.
2d 306, para. 4 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 First Report and Or-

der].
43

See id. at para. 3.
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the Commission, in 1946, to create a defacto limit
of up to seven nationally owned AM and FM radio
stations. 42 The amended multiple-ownership rules
were called upon to serve two objectives: (1) to
foster maximum competition in broadcasting;
and (2) to promote diversification of program43
ming sources and viewpoints.
C.

Promoting Competition & 'Diversity

"If our democratic society is to function, nothing can be more important than ensuring that
there is a free flow of information from as many
divergent sources as possible." 44 Although the
"rule of seven" remained the status quo for more
than three decades, by 1984, the FCC took a turn
towards total deregulation. The FCC was convinced that the goals of diversity and competition
could no longer be recognized through ownership caps, 45 and in 1990 ordered a complete repeal of its national ownership ceilings. 46 The
Commission decided that the public interest was
47
better served by repealing the seven station rule.
In response to the industry's frustration to the
FCC's deregulation efforts, the Commission decided that the proposed abandonment of the
ownership caps was not necessary to achieve its
goals. 48 Instead, the Commission ruled that a single entity was permitted to own up to twelve AM
49
and twelve FM stations nationally.
The Commission's strict policies against duopo44 See Henry Geller, Ownership Regulatory Policies in the U.S.
Telecom Sector, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.L.J. 727, 730 (1995).
45 In re Amendment of Section 73.355 (formerly Sections
73.35, 73.240, and 73.636) of the Commissions Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and TV Brdcst. Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, para. 18 (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 Report and Order] (noting that, "since 1954

the Commission has several times revisited the Seven. Station
Rule, but only to question whether an absolute numerical
limit, rather than geographic or nature of service limits, was
the most appropriate form of regulation").
46 See 1984 Report and Order, supra note 45, at para. 108
(stating that "... th e record.., establishes that the appropriate market for ideas is primarily local, and includes a broad

variety of means of communications, especially cablecasting,

newspapers, and opinion magazines, in addition to radio and
television...") Id. ". . .[T]he ideal market is a national one,
[and must be] ... sufficiently diverse so as to be unaffected

by a change in the Seven Station Rule; and that network and
group owners contribute to viewpoint diversity through the
quality and quantity of their public-affairs programming." Id.
47 See 1984 Report and Order, supra note 45 at para. 3.
48 See id. at para. 30.
49 See id. at para. 5.
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lies 50 gave way to economic considerations resulting in a relaxation of the national radio caps. 5 1
Specifically, the rapid growth in the number of radio stations and non-radio outlets increased competition in the radio industry, thereby causing financial difficulties for certain broadcasters. 52 By
1992, the FCC adopted a new duopoly rule, to allow broadcasters to have the potential to develop
and thrive in a competitive environment, thus en53
couraging ownership diversity and competition.
In 1994, noting the increase in competition provided by a multitude of non-radio sources, the
FCC increased the national radio ownership caps
54
to twenty AM and twenty FM stations.
III.

A.

FREE AT LAST, FREE AT LAST?
DEREGULATION OF OWNERSHIP
RESTRICTIONS IN THE INTEREST OF
COMPETITION RESULT IN AN
INCREASE IN THE CONCENTRATION
OF OWNERSHIP
Ownership Limits After The 1996 Act

The 1996 Act struck an unintended blow to local broadcast diversity. The Act commanded the
Commission to eradicate all ownership limitations
on the number of radio stations any one party
may own on the national level. 5 5 Congress rea-

soned that such a drastic measure was not short
sighted because the goals of radio ownership regulation had been achieved. 56 In concluding that
the radio industry had achieved adequate levels of
50
See 1970FirstReport and Order, supra note 42, at 5. (stating that the Commission's duopoly rules were designed early

in the 1970's for the purpose of restricting concentration of
broadcast media control, and were structured to proscribe
common ownership, operation, or control of more than one
broadcast station in the same area, regardless of the type of
broadcast service). See id.
51
See 1992 Report and Order supra, note 51, at para. 23
(modifiying the Commission's ownership rules by relaxing its

cap from 12 AM and FM stations to 30 AM and FM stations
and limiting a single owner to one-half of one percent of the
total number of licensed stations).
52
See id. at para 2.
53
See In Re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 3275, para. 3 (1991)(explaining that it was necessary to balance diversity with the

need to foster economic growth in order to provide vigorous
competition).
54 In re Revision of Radio Rules, Second Memorandum and
Opinion Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 7183, para. 1 (1994) Minority own-

ers were permitted to own up to 25 stations in each service.
See id. at para. 5. Further, non-minority broadcasters could
exceed the national limits by up to five, but only if such ex-

competition and diversity, Congress cited the
existence of 11,000 radio stations nationwide, with
an average of twenty-five radio stations in each
market.57 However, Congress failed to sufficiently
consider the impact this measure would have on
minority and local ownership.

B.

Local Restrictions on Ownership

In addition to the removal of national ownership caps in radio, Congress altered ownership restrictions at the local level. In particular, Section
202(b) of the 1996 Act5 8 now permits common
ownership of radio stations as follows: (1) a party
may own, operate, or control up to eight commercial radio stations, not to exceed five in the same
service (AM or FM) in radio markets with fortyfive or more commercial radio stations; (2) an
owner may own, operate, or control up to seven
commercial radio stations, not to exceed four in
the same service, if the party is in a market of between thirty and forty-four commercial radio stations; (3) in markets between fifteen and twentynine commercial radio stations a party may own,
operate, or control up to six commercial radio stations, not exceeding four in the same service; and
(4) in markets with less than fourteen commercial
radio stations, a party may own, operate, or control at the most five such stations, not to exceed
three of which are in the same service, with the
exception that a party may not own, operate, or
control more than fifty percent of the stations in
cess were non-controlling interests in minority or small busi-

ness controlled AM or FM stations. See id.
55 See The 1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
56 See 1984 Report and Order, supra note 45 at 61. The
Commission concluded in 1984 that group owners do not impose monolithic viewpoints on local media outlet, and further that the public has available to it an abundance of other
media outlets including over 10,000 broadcast stations, and
12,000 newspapers and periodicals, thereby offsetting any
threats concentrated ownership may have on encouraging diversity of voices and the "public interest" mandate. See id.
57 See Jill Howard, Congress Errs in Deregulating Broadcast
Ownership Caps: More Monopolies, Less Localism, DecreasedDiversity and Violations of Equal Protection,5
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269, 275 (1997) (explaining that Congress justified the deregulation of the telecommunications industry by reaching a
consensus that the broadcast environment indicates that limitations on broadcast ownership are not needed, and further
that radio station owners need the deregulation so that they
may be in a position to compete in the marketplace).
58
202(b) of the 1996 Act requires the Commission to
modify 47 C.F.R. 73.3555 to eliminate ownership limits. The
Commission has done so. See 47 C.F.R. 73.3555(a) (i) (1).
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such markets. 59

C.

Ownership Consolidation Begins

Congressional relaxation of ownership limits
has resulted in less competition, and consequently, less diversity in the broadcasting marketplace. The effect of the 1996 Act is that the concept of the "public interest" is now secondary to
other (i.e. corporate) interests. Congress' attempt
to promote competition 60 has unfortunately triggered a destructive chain of events culminating in
an increased concentration of ownership. For example, during the first month of the 1996 Act's
existence, over $2 billion in radio station sales
61
were concluded; an unprecedented volume.
March and April of 1996 were an even stronger
indication of the consolidation trend. Most notably, Infinity, the second largest radio group,
merged with the even larger Westinghouse/
CBS, 6 2 creating the largest acquisition in radio
history. 63 The Westinghouse/CBS merger resulted in the combined company owning fifty FM
stations and thirty-three AM stations throughout
sixteen markets with sixty-nine of its eighty-three
outlets in the largest ten markets. 64 Additionally,
other figures indicate that the purchase of Heftel
Broadcasting by Clear Channel Communications
netted an astonishing total of one-hundred eight
65
radio stations.
The result has been a "squeeze out" of local, independently owned radio stations by large corporations. A new trend has emerged is the explosion
of "radio pirates." 6 6 Radio pirates, seeking their
See The 1996 Act supra, note 56.
The proffered purpose of the 1996 Act is to "promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid development of
new telecommunications technologies." 47 U.S.C.A. § 151
(1994 & Supp. 11 1997). See also In re Review of the Commission's Regs. Governing Television Brdcst., FurtherNotice of Proposed Rule Making. 10 FCC Rcd. 3524, para. 15, (1995) (discussing the promotion of competition as a means of
effectively, and efficiently utilizing resources).
61 Peter K. Pitsch, An "InnovationAge" Perspective on Telecommunications Mergers, (visited January 20, 1999) <http://
www.cse.org/cse/pitch.html/>.
62 See Geraldine Fabrikant, CBS Accepts Bid By Westinghouse; $5.4 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al (stating that the deal would create 15 television stations and 39
radio stations, allowing direct access to over one third of the
nation's households). See id. See also Albert R. Karr, Westing59
60

house Corp.: CBS Purchase Completed in $5.4 Billion Agreement,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1996, at B3.

own slice of the broadcast spectrum, have responded to the concentration of radio stations in
the hands of large corporations by operating
small unlicensed radio stations. 67 Although the

FCC has consistently enforced its policies and
shut down pirate operations, this new trend suggests that local groups are fighting to gain control
of their share of the public radio spectrum, however small. This pattern seems to indicate that
many Americans are dissatisfied with the broadcast programming and media in its current form.
Furthermore, it underscores the unforeseen desire of many small communities to maintain local
control of the airwaves and have access to a wide
variety of programming through a diversity of media outlets.
The Act's Impact on Minority Ownership

D.

Consolidation has made it increasingly difficult
for small operators and proprietors to enter into
the radio industry. Its impact has been most
prominent on minority broadcasters. Less than
three percent of radio stations are minority6
owned, and that number is steadily declining.
The trend in minority ownership is clearly
counter to the industry as a whole. 69 Minority

owned broadcast outlets have rapidly become remote islands in an ocean of corporate broadcasters.
In 1994 and 1995, the percentage of minority
ownership of broadcast stations was dramatically
higher than it is today. 70 The on-going merger
mania has served only to create barriers for mi63 See Chuck Taylor, Telecommunications Act Defined Year In
Radio Station Sales And Mergers, WKTU, Internet Top '96

News,

BILLBOARD,

Dec. 28, 1996.

See Chuck Taylor, Westinghouse, Infinity Merger Fuels
Consolidation Concerns, Billboard, Jul. 6, 1996.
65
See id.
66
See Cullen, supra note 13.
67
See Ruggiero, supra note 1, at 27.
68
NTIA Report on Minority Commercial Broadcast
Ownership in the United States, Overview of the 1997, 1998
64

Survey Results. <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/opadhome/minown98/main.htm> (visited January 27, 1999) (reporting
that 165 minority broadcasters own 337 of 11,524 commer-

cial radio and television stations in America. But the increase
in minority commercial ownership between 1997 and 1998

was only slight, from 2.8% to 2.9%, a total net gain of 15
stations).
69

See id. Between 1993 and 1995, the broadcast industry

acquired 503 new stations. See id. However, during this same
period, minorities gained only 15 new stations. See id.
70

See id.
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norities struggling to compete in the broadcast industry. 7 1 Minority broadcasters, generally with
limited capital and resources, are finding it increasingly difficult to compete in a rapidly consolidating industry, where, for example, large conglomerates, such as CBS and Chancellor Media,
have increased their holdings, causing station
prices to increase substantially. 72 In a recent study
conducted by the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, minority owners
attributed the lack of sufficient access to capital as
the primary deterrent to increased minority ownership. 73 Because

of this,

potential

minority

broadcasters are effectively prevented from serving their communities. The benefits of local perspectives and minority viewpoints on important issues are lost to the media conglomerates. The
consolidation of ownership resulting from the
1996 Act has produced a decline in diversity of
ownership and localism, thus threatening the ideals of a society enriched by disparate voices.
IV.

A.

THE PENDULUM OF CHANGE: TIME TO
SWING BACK TO DIVERSITY OF
OWNERSHIP & LOCALISM
The FCC's NPRM on the Creation of Low
Power Radio Service

1. Is Low Power Broadcasting the Solution?
In response to over 13,000 inquiries in the past
year from individuals and groups expressing an
interest in starting a low power radio station, the
FCC, on February 3, 1999, issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making, [hereinafter Low Power Radio
Service NPRM] seeking comment on the creation
of a low power radio service. 74 The Commission
indicated that some of its major goals in creating
low power radio stations would include: (1) pro71 See id. Since the enactment of the 1996 Act, minority
owners reportedly have experienced heightened competition
for nationally syndicated. programming and have further
noted more difficulty in securing advertisers. See id. In addition, minority owners noted that their businesses were negatively effected by media concentration since the passage of
the 1996 Act; therefore, larger, majority owned companies
have greater market power, giving group owners even greater
control and power over advertising revenues and programming. See id.

72
73
74

75

See id.
See id.
See Low Power Radio Service NPRM, supra note 16.
See id. at para 1.

viding new opportunities for community-oriented
radio broadcasting; and, (2) establishing more avenues for new radio broadcast ownership in an effort to promote additional diversity in radio voices
and programming, without jeopardizing the integrity of the spectrum. 75 The Commission fur-

ther asserted the need to create a low power radio
service that would provide a low-cost means of
76
serving urban communities and neighborhoods.
The Low Power Radio Service NPRM proposed
new services designed to meet a variety of local
needs and capabilities, from broad community
77
based coverage to smaller neighborhood areas.
Specifically, the Commission's proposal includes a
service with primary frequency usage status to operate at a maximum effective radiated power
("ERP") of 1000 watts and an antenna height of
60 meters, thus covering a service area of approximately 8.8 mile radius.7 8 It also proposed a secondary service to operate at up to 100 watts and 30
79
meters, with a service radius of up to 3.5 miles.
Additionally, the Commission sought comment
on a 1-10 watt "microradio" class of stations with
an antenna height of 30 meters and a service area
of one to two miles.8 0 Lastly, it asked for comment
on whether these microradio stations should be
limited to noncommercial entities and whether
educational institutions are the best potential low
power FM licensees."'
The FCC's efforts to establish and seek comments concerning the creation of a low power radio service, serves as some indication that it is
mindful of the dramatic impact the 1996 Act has
had on the radio industry.8 2 The fact that the Act
does not have a clear foundation for widespread
ownership in the industry, as evidenced by the
alarming number of mergers, 3 is indicative of the
need for the Commission to reassess its current
broadcast regulations. Furthermore, the creation
See id.
See id.
78
See id. at paras. 23-24.
79 See id. at paras. 30-32.
80 See Low Power Radio Service NPRM, at paras. 34-37.
81 See id. at paras. 68-70.
82
See Kennard Address at NAB, supra note 4; See also Tristani Address before TBA, supra note 7 (expressing concern by
the Chairman and the Commissioner, respectively, over the
rapid number of mergers since the passage of the 1996 Act,
and its negative impact on minority ownership and diversity
of voices).
83
See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
76

77
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of a low power radio service would certainly be
consistent with the spirit of the Communications
Act of 1934 and the legislature's intent to promote the public interest and to maintain the
FCC's duty to promote diversity of media voices.
B.

Diversity of Ownership Equals a Diversity of
Voices: The Need for LPFM Service

The plethora of media outlets that are available
to the public today, exclusive of radio, provides a
marketplace of ideas, of sorts. However, these
multifarious outlets do not serve as a substitute for
the need of radio to be a diverse outlet for the
public discourse, particularly on the local level.
The establishment of a microstation radio
broadcasting service would not only provide additional outlets of broadcast information, services,
and entertainment, but it would also serve to promote diversity of ownership in the media.8 4 Ownership diversity will be achieves by establishing
three disincentives to corporate control. Microstations would be limited to one per owner. The licensee would have to ensure that the service
would be local and the licensee would have to
maintain local programming. The creation of a
new low power FM broadcast service would facilitate the needs of small cities or neighborhoods urban areas and would generate sufficient revenue
to operate as niche facilities. In addition, the creation of microradio stations would provide much
needed opportunities for individual citizens and
small community groups to operate low power ra84
See In Re Proposal for Creation of Low Power FM
Broadcast Service, Petition for Rulemaking, (Submitted by J.
Rodger Skinner, Jr.) RM-9242 (Feb. 20, 1998) (proposing the
creation of three classes of LPFM service: a "primary service"
class, a "secondary service" station as well as "special events"
stations) [hereinafter Skinner Petition] See id. at para. 7. Under
the Skinner Petition, the primary service would have effective
radiate power levels from at least 50 watts and a maximum
power level of 3 kilowatts, with a minimum antenna height of
328 feet (100 meters). See id. at para. 23. The "secondary service" would be for those owners that prefer to conform to a

more structured form of broadcasting; the requirements

would include a minimum power of 1 watt and maximum
power of 50 watts with maximum antenna height of 328 feet
(100 meters). See id. at para. 25. Finally, the "special event"
stations would be available for those interested in broadcasting information about local events that occur over a period
of time not to exceed ten days. See id. at para. 27. These
LPFM "special event" stations would have a maximum power
limit of 20 watts and a maximum antenna height of 100 feet.
See id.
85
See Petitionfor a Microstation Radio Broadcasting Service,
(submitted by Nickolaus Leggett et. al.) RM-9208 (July 17,
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dio stations, thereby allowing for direct citizen in85
volvement in broadcasting.
Low power radio service would solve the radio
piracy problem that has grown as a result of consolidation.8 6 Radio pirates, or "micro-broadcasters," would no longer feel squeezed out of the
market place. An affordable low power service
would provide radio pirates a low-cost avenue in
which they would not have to compete with incumbent broadcasters for the opportunity to serve
their communities.8 7 The creation of a LPFM service would substitute a legal means for unlicensed
micro-broadcasters to participate in the airwaves.
Lastly, microradio stations would cause a significant increase in minority ownership by significantly lowering the barriers to entry into the radio
industry. The ranks of minority broadcasters
would increase because of the existence of more
affordable opportunities for ownership and a
larger pool of potential radio facilities available
for licensing. 8
C.

The FCC Still Has a Mandate Under the
1934 & 1996 Acts to Promote Diversity of
Media

The Communications Act of 1934, as amended
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, continues to support a public policy of promoting diversity in the media through its broad mandate to
regulate in the public interest convenience and
necessity. Although the Communications Act of
1934 does not specifically identify diversity as a
1997) (proposing the assignment of one AM broadcast and
one FM broadcast channel to microstation owners) [hereinafter Leggett Petition]. Under the plan in the Leggett Petition,
each owner would be assigned to a specific geographic location or cell, thereby preventing any interference between the
microstations. See id. For purposes of promoting diversity, a
licensee, would only be able to purchase stations located no
more than 50 miles from each other. See id. at para. 1.4.
86, See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
See Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, Theirs To
87
Steal, Ours To Win: Battle For The Soundwaves, COUNTERPUNCH,
Vol. 6 No.6, 6 (March 16-31, 1999). For a brief discussion on
the technical advantages and disadvantages of LPFM, see generally Carl Marcucci, Examining LPFM: the technical pros and
cons, ENGINEERED FOR PROFIT, at 7 (March 15, 1999).
88 See The Skinner Petition, supra note 86, at para. 12 (suggesting that by placing media ownership restrictions on applicants, i.e. the entity or individual must prove residence
within 50-miles of the proposed station's antenna site, only
local owners will be able to compete for licenses, thus lowering economic barrier entries, and assuring significant minority ownership).
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goal of the Act, sections 151,89 303,90 and 30991
indicate strong Congressional intent for the maintenance of diversity by the Commission.
The stated purpose of the Act is detailed in Section 151.92 It is in this section that Congress has

given the Commission the authority to enforce
the provisions of the Act, which, when taken together with the previously noted sections, is indicative of the FCC's right to maintain and advance
the principles of diversity in broadcasting.
In the same vein, Section 309 directs the Commission to grant applications with the public interest in mind. 93 This section describes generally
94
the process for obtaining a broadcast license. It
emphasizes that, in granting licenses, the Commission should do so in a manner that will promote diversity .in media communications. 95 In
terms of promoting diversity in the broadcast industry, this section of the Communications Act is
the most significant to the Commission's efforts to
ensure diversity in the airwaves. At the very least,

this section gives the FCC leeway to develop rules
that will grant preferences to applicants where the
granting of those licenses would result in an increase in diversification of media ownership. 96 A
low power FM service would promote diversity of
ownership, particularly on the local end. It would
ensure that small communities and individual
owners receive their fair share of the market,
while promoting the FCC's interest in the diversification of the radio industry.
Despite deregulation of broadcasting by the
1996 Act, the Commission has not completely
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
47 U.S.C. § 309 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
92
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997). ("For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far
as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service", Id. "there is created a commission to be
known as the 'Federal Communications Commission', which
shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and shall execute and enforce the provisions of this chapter"). Id.
93
47 U.S.C. § 309 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
94 Id.
95 Id. § 309(i) (3) (A) (1994) ("The Commission shall es89
90
91

tablish rules and procedures to ensure that .

.

. significant

preferences will be granted to applicants or groups of applicants, the grant to which of the license or permit would increase the diversification of ownership of the media of mass
communications").
96 See id.
97 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
98 See id. at § 257(a) (1994 & Supp. 111997) (stating that,

abandoned the maintenance of diversity of media
voices. 9 7 For example, section 257(a) directs the
FCC to conduct proceedings for the purpose of
identifying and eliminating market entry barriers.98 This section is specifically aimed at entrepreneurs, minorities and other small business
owners who may otherwise experience difficulties
in entering the broadcast field. 99 Congress mandated these proceedings to assist the Commission
in its efforts to promote the goals of the 1996
Act.1 00
The FCC continues to have a statutory mandate
to promote and maintain diverse viewpoints in
broadcasting. The creation of low power radio stations clearly would be consistent with the Commission's mandate to encourage diversity. Because a LPFM service can be created to serve small
communities, be locally owned, and air local programming, it would naturally result in diverse
viewpoints and diversity in ownership. In addition, it would provide desperately needed outlets
for individuals and small organizations to participate in the industry without encumbering full
power radio stations, and without spectrum interference problems. 1° 1
Incumbent broadcasters wishing to preserve the
status quo have argued that the existing radio stations are already serving the myriad of needs and
interests of local communities.' 0 2 They contend
that the public is better served when radio stations
are consolidated because broadcasters can combine AM and FM stations operations in one facility, and the accompanying cost savings will allow
"...the Commission shall seek to promote the policies and
purposes of this chapter favoring diversity of media voices,
vigorous economic competition, technological advancement,
and promotion of the public interest, convenience, and necessity").
99

See id.

See id. at § 257(b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
See Low Power Radio Service NPRM supra note 16, at
para. 15-21 (proposing minimum distance separation between. LPFM stations as the best practical means of preventing interference between low power radio and full power FM
stations). It would require co-channel (or same channel)
and 1st adjacent channel protections, but the Commission.
did not believe that 3rd adjacent channel and possibly 2nd
adjacent channel protection would not be necessary in view
of the low power levels and other factors. See id.
102 See, e.g., Low Power Radio Service NPRM, supra note 17,
at para. 9. See also Elizabeth A. Rathburn, A CrusaderAgainst
100

101

Microradio, BROADCASTING

AND CABLE,

March 15, 1999 at 85

(explaining that large broadcasters believe that microradio is
not the best path to increasing diversity in the industry).
Rather, large broadcasters believe that mergers allow the radio business to be much more efficient) See id. ,
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more varied programming from the station group
than one independent station could offer to the
community. 10 3 What these arguments fail to recognize is that there is a need for individual and
small group ownership in the industry. Diversity
does not necessarily emerge from creating stations that provide various "formats" to the community. On the contrary, diversity results from
decentralized ownership and diverse local programming addressed to the specific needs of a
small community. The incumbent broadcasters
have not recognized the benefits of low power stations that will cater to the narrow and specific interests of small communities and neighborhoods.
Further, the argument that microradio will
harm full power broadcasters has long been discounted.10 4 Indeed, the FCC has repeatedly rejected the contention that the radio frequency
spectrum should be artificially underutilized to
protect incumbent users.1 05 Despite fears of major
broadcasters, 10 6 there are proposed technical solutions that could resolve the interference concerns. 0 7 The ability to create ownership diversity
in radio outweighs any minimal amount of interference that might result from the creation of a
low power radio service. The benefits of a low
power service, such as promoting local expression
and diverse outlets for small niche markets, far
transcend any potential burdens on large broadcasters. Microradio has the potential to spawn diversity of ownership in media, which could spark a
rebirth of local radio through the divergence of
viewpoints on the air.
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promotion and maintenance of diversity of voices
in broadcasting. In 1945, the Supreme Court held
in Associated Press v. United States10 8 that a district
court correctly granted summary judgment to enjoin members of a press association from acting in
restraint of trade.10 9 The Supreme Court upheld
the district court's finding that the bylaws of the
Associated Press constituted a restraint on trade
because they stifled competition in the newspaper
publishing industry. 110 The Court found that the
First Amendment called for the "widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.""'1
In Red Lion v. FCC,1 2 the Court also emphasized the goals of the First Amendment and the
11 3 Specifiprotection of the distribution of ideas.
cally, the Court declared that, "it is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
14
broadcasters, which is paramount."'
The Court asserted that no licensee has a First
Amendment right to a broadcast license, nor the
right to monopolize a frequency to the exclusion
of other licensees." 5 By stating that, "it is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market," 1 6 the Supreme
Court implied that the First Amendment requires
the maintenance and promotion of diversity in
1 17
broadcasting.
In 1990, the Supreme Court again articulated a
public policy of maintaining diversity in broadcast

The 1st Amendment Mandates Diversity of
Viewpoints and Ownership

D.

The judiciary has a similar desire to support the
See id. at 85.
See Carroll Broadcast. Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440

12, (explaining that "any potential loss experienced [by in-

viewpoints on microradio and the FCC's attack on radio pirates).
See Skinner Petition, supra note 86, at paras. 28-35.
107
108 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
109 Id. at. 5.
110 Id. at 11-12.
111 Id. at 20.
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
112
113 Id. at 390-92.
114
See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.

cumbents] will be more than offset by the benefits of such a
policy, it is in the public interest to have a regulatory framework that permits the maximum number of signals that can
be economically viable").
106 See, e.g., Radio Free Florida, VIBE MAGAZINE, Oct. 1998
at 110 (discussing the National Association of Broadcasters'

Id. at 390.
In Red Lion, the petitioner, Fred Cook, sought free
airtime to counter-attack an opponent. Id. at 371-2. The FCC
and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, both agreed that Cook was entitled to the free air-

103
104

(1958).
See, e.g., In re Commercial FM Broadcast Assignments,
105
94 F.C.C. 2d 152, 158 (1983) (noting that a "basic objective"

of the Commission has been to provide "outlets for local expression addressing each community's needs and interests").
See also Television Channel Allotments (VHFDrop-ins)Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 72902 (1980) at paras. 9 &

115
116
117

Id.
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ownership. In Metro Broadcasting,Inc., v. FCC,118
the Court held that the FCC's policies in favor of
promoting minority interests were a valid means
of exercising the FCC's authority. 119 In Metro
Broadcasting,the Court reasoned that the policies
promoting program diversity were an important
governmental goal that could stand up to constitutional challenges.1 20 The court noted that safeguarding the public's right to receive diverse radio programming has always been an integral
component of the FCC's mission under the Communications Act of 1934.121
Five years later, the Supreme Court essentially
overruled its analysis in Metro. In Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena,122 the Supreme Court concluded that all minority preferences, including
those involving "benign classification," must be
analyzed under a "strict scrutiny" standard. 123 In
Adarand, the Supreme Court reviewed a minority
preference program under the auspices of the
Small Business Administration ("SBA"). Adarand
involved a minority contractor certified by the
SBA as meeting specific racial and economic factors that qualified them for special preferences. 124
Adarand Constructors, a non-minority owned
business, lost a U.S. Department of Transportation bid to construct a highway project, despite
qualifying for the work and submitting the lowest
bid.'

25

The Supreme Court concluded under the

new test that all race-conscious measures must be
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling govern1
mental interest.

26

Three years later, in Lutheran Church v. FCC' 27
the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit applied the Supreme Court's
Adarand-based "strict scrutiny" test to strike down
the FCC's EEO program for licensing radio and
television stations. In this case, the Lutheran
Church Missouri Synod appealed the FCC's finding that it had violated the EEO regulations
time. Id. The respondent, Red Lion, a small Pennsylvania
broadcaster, challenged the district court's conclusion that
section 315 of the Communications Act indicates that the

"public interest" is best served by all sides of a controversial
issue thus vindicating the notion that the Fairness Doctrine is
an integral part of the FCC's decree. Id. at 372-73, 380.
118 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
119 Id. at 552.
120

Id. at 554-55.

121

Id. at 565.
515 U.S. 200(1995).
Id. at. 227
Id. at 205.

122
123
124

through the use of the Church's religious hiring
preferences and as well as for its inadequate minority recruiting.1 28 The court reasoned that the
FCC's EEO regulations were not narrowly tailored
and did not meet a compelling governmental in29
terest.'
Although the Court in Adarand and Lutheran
Church has backed away from public policy arguments for promoting diversity in the broadcast industry, nothing in the holdings of these cases precludes the FCC from promoting diversity of
ownership. Indeed, although both cases overturned the analysis that the Court first upheld in
Metro Broadcasting,that diversity could serve as a
constitutional compelling governmental interest, 130 by no means should the FCC abandon its
efforts to ensure diverse viewpoints and the economic opportunity of minorities and small
groups. There is still room for the FCC to operate.
The Court in Adarand, for example, overturned
Metro Broadcastingonly "to the extent it is inconsistent with [its] holding. '13 1 In other words, if the
Court in Metro Broadcastinghad applied a strict
scrutiny standard, the Commission's minority
preference policies would still be good law. From
this point, it should be noted that although the
Court in Metro Broadcastingdid not expand on the
issue of diversity, the Court did comment that "at
the very least," diversity of viewpoint is an important governmental interest.1 32 The Commission is
therefore not averse to promoting diversity of
ownership alone as a compelling government interest. In addition, ownership diversity promotes
the strong government interest of remedying past
discrimination in the broadcast industry. Furthermore, the Court in Lutheran Church limited its
holding to employment practices, not ownership.
Therefore, although diversity of content, according to the Court, is not a compelling interest, di-

126

Id. at 204
Id. at 235

127

141 F.3d 344 (1998).

128

Id. at 356.

129

Id. at 354.

130

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 258.

131

Id. at 227.

125

See Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (stating
that, "the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, at the
very least, an important governmental objective and is therefore a sufficient basis for the Commission's minority ownership policies").
132
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versity of ownership could very well be a compelling interest for the government to promote.
A low power radio service would provide the
FCC with the opportunity to remedy past discrimination in broadcast ownership, while promoting
diversity of viewpoints on the airwaves. A LPFM
service is a means to provide a much needed outlet for local expression and opportunities for
small groups and minorities to enter the radio industry and be heard.
These major Court decisions do not foreclose
the FCC from promoting policies favoring program diversity. Indeed, the FCC is still empowered
to promote diversity in the broadcast industry and
has a compelling interest in doing so through the
creation of a low power radio service.
E. Localism: The Bedrock of the Broadcast
System
The principle of localism has helped to guide
the Commission in promulgating regulations for
many years. 133 Indeed, the FCC's predominant,

although not exclusive method for shaping content and viewpoint diversity through broadcast licensing was its localism policy. 3 4 As far back as
1955, the Court recognized that the "distribution
of a second license to a community in order to
secure local competition for originating and
broadcasting programs of local interest [fell]
within the [Commission's] allowable area of discretion"1 35 to make "a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service" among different
localities. 136

Broadcasting is a unique medium of communications

to

local

neighborhoods.

37

Localism,

which stems from the licensee concept, has been
a means by which the broadcast field has developed into a universal service designed to address
the specific needs and concerns of local communities. 138 With the consolidation of ownership re133
See Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership
on Content: Does It Matter? 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 755,
761 (1995).
134
See, e.g. F.C.C. v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349
U.S. 358, 361 (1955) (noting that the Commission, under
section 307(b) of the Communications act, is empowered to
permit licenses so as to provide a fair distribution among
communities and further, that fairness to communities
means the recognition of their local needs). In addition, the
Commission is empowered to distribute second licenses to a

community for purposes of securing local competition for
originating and broadcasting programs of local interest. See
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suiting from the passage of the 1996 Act and its
deregulation of ownership rules, the effect has
been to squeeze out many local voices in the radio
industry. 13 9 Further, more consolidation means

an increase in the number of absentee owners of
broadcast stations. Absentee owners are less likely
to know the community they serve, and thus are
more likely to rely on stereotypes when making
programming decisions. Accordingly, the "new
barons of radio convert their stations from local
presence's into cash cows for instant milking,
their values ballooned for trading to the next
buyer." 140 Thus the consolidation process, which

has resulted in decreased localism, is a consequence that is difficult even for large group owners to challenge, particularly when they admit outright that, "[i]t's commodity trading to us. We
don't know [our] community. We're short term
14
players." 1
The demise of localism through the consolidation crunch threatens the expression of local
voices and makes it unbearably difficult for small
groups and individual owners to survive in the industry. The creation of a low power radio service
could clearly revive the nearly dead spirit of localism by creating expressive opportunities and re42
ducing market entry barriers. 1

V.

CONCLUSION

In a democracy, the people must have access to
diverse opinions about public affairs and information that directly affect their communities and
families. Concentration of ownership in the hands
of a few jeopardizes the entire concept of a diverse and informative media that lies at the foundation of a healthy democracy.
The FCC's Low Power Radio Service NPRM is a
means to offset the negative effects of the 1996
Act on local ownership and diversity in the radio
industry. Additionally, the elimination of the
id.
135

Id. at 362.

136 Id. at 360 n.1, 362 n.5 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 307(b) (1994).
137

See

Gigi B. Sohn and Andrew Jay Schwartzman,

Broadcast Licensees and Localism: At Home in the "Communications Revolution" 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 383, 388 (1994).
138
See id.
139
See supra note 7.
141 142 Cong. Rec. S 6108 (1996).
141
Id.
142
See Skinner Petition, supra note 86, at para. 13.
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Commission's EEO regulations through past
court decisions is even more reason to rectify the
status of minorities in the media through the use
of LPFM service. Microradio will enable the FCC
to realize the ideals of a media operating in the

public interest through the reemergence of local
ownership and the rich diversity of programming
that can flow from a media in the hands of the
many.

